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Abstract
How often will elections end in landslides? What is the probability for a head-to-head race? Analyzing ballot results from
several large countries rather anomalous and yet unexplained distributions have been observed. We identify tactical voting
as the driving ingredient for the anomalies and introduce a model to study its effect on plurality elections, characterized by
the relative strength of the feedback from polls and the pairwise interaction between individuals in the society. With this
model it becomes possible to explain the polarization of votes between two candidates, understand the small margin of
victories frequently observed for different elections, and analyze the polls’ impact in American, Canadian, and Brazilian
ballots. Moreover, the model reproduces, quantitatively, the distribution of votes obtained in the Brazilian mayor elections
with two, three, and four candidates.
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Introduction
The outcome of elections is one of the most stunning phenomena
of democracy. Sometimes one candidate wins in a landslide victory
and many times two candidates compete head-to-head leaving much
suspense. What is the probability of finding a certain situation? This
question can be assessed through the distribution of the percentages
thateachcandidateobtainsandhasinfactbeenmonitoredinseveral
large countries with reasonably good statistics. Instead of being
Gaussian as one would expect in a simple-minded application of the
central limit theorem, an anomalous distribution has been observed.
Different mechanisms can affect the electors’ opinion formation
during an electoral process [1–7]. Understanding the effect of such
mechanisms poses interesting challenges to both political sciences
[4,8,9] and statisticalphysics [10,11]. Onedistinguishes two different
types of elections [12]: proportional elections, where candidates
become elected in proportion to their party’s voting fraction [13–
16], and plurality elections, where only the most voted candidate gets
a position [17]. Besides, the latter type can occur on one single ballot
or be ‘‘run-off majority’’ voting, with two rounds. For each type of
election different mechanisms were identified [2,12]. We focus on
plurality elections with one single ballot. To describe the tactical
strategies applied by electors when q candidates compete against
each other, we introduce a model where the competition between
pairwise interaction with peers and polls feedback is considered.
For plurality elections tactical voting as a response to information
frompollsisadominanteffect.Specifically,sinceonlythe mostvoted
candidate will win, electors can change their vote to an ‘‘unwanted’’
candidate just to decrease the margin of victory (also known as
‘‘useful vote’’). Maurice Duverger, a French sociologist, recognized
this effect as responsible for the emergence of two-party systems in a
statement known, today, as Duverger’s law [12]. Empirical results
from different electoral processes also reveal that, typically, victories
occur by small margins. As an example, let us consider the 2008
American presidential elections. The maps of Fig. 1 show the
difference in the fraction of votes (fv) between Barack Obama and
John McCain per county (left) and per state (right), defined as
fv~vO{vM, ð1Þ
where vO and vM are, respectively, the fraction of votes for the
Democratic and Republican candidates. For a more quantitative
analysis, Fig. 2 contains the histograms of the differences in the
fraction of votes per county, considering the entire set, Fig. 2(a), or
only for the ones with more than 20 thousand electors, Fig. 2(b). We
observe from these maps and histograms typical head-to-head runs.
In fact, only in a few counties where the difference in the fraction of
votes is slightly above 0:4, and, at the scale of the state, only margins
of victory (fv)b e l o w0:4 appear. From both histograms we conclude
that landslides mostly occur for counties with a small number of
electors.
Recently, Restrepo et al. [18] proposed a population dynamics
model to study the effect of polls released during the electoral
process. They considered two different scenarios: head-to-head and
landslide voting. In the former, the margin between the first and
secondcandidateissotightthatindividualstendtosticktheirvoteto
their favorite candidate. In the latter, the leading candidate has a
large margin with respect to all the others, which increases the
tendency towards tactical voting. To study the effect of the ‘‘useful
vote’’ on the ballots, we propose a model where a vote results from
the competition between two mechanisms: the tendency to align
with peers (herding) and the ‘‘useful vote’’ [19]. The first one,
corresponds to an attractive interaction between somewhat linked
electors and solely depends on their opinion. The second
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proportional to the difference between the fraction of votes of the
leading candidate (vf) and the second one (vs). The larger the
difference, the stronger the tendency towards tactical voting. Let us
consider q candidates identified by an index s~1,:::,q. We propose
a balance function F to quantify the degree of indecision in the
society due to the coexistence of different opinions, defined as
F~{H
X
vi,jw
d(si, sj)za(vf{vs)
X
i
d(si, f), ð2Þ
where si is the candidate for which citizen i votes and f is the
index of the leading candidate (Note that, vf can only assume
values ranging between 1=q and unity.). The delta function
d(si,sj) is unity when i and j chose the same candidate and zero
otherwise. The herding coefficient H measures the strength of
interaction between connected individuals and a the polls impact.
The natural tendency in society is to minimize its degree of
indecision. Together with the principle of maximum entropy, this
leads to a probability distribution of each state P!exp({F).
Curiously, in the absence of polls (a~0), our model boils down to
the so-called q-state ‘‘Potts model’’ used in magnetism [20]. ForH
above Hc a stable majority opinion can arise, while below it, the
interaction between individuals is insufficient to lead to a fixed
majority. The system is then controlled by the competition
between the relative strength of the polls impact, a=H, and its
Figure 1. Empirical results for the 2008 American presidential elections. Maps of the relative difference of votes, fv, in each county (left) and
each state (right) showing typical head-to-head runs. Each color represents an interval of 0:2. Blue refers to a landslide victory of Barack Obama and
red to a victory of John McCain. Green corresponds to a head-to-head run.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012446.g001
Figure 2. Histogram of the relative difference of votes for the 2008 American presidential elections in each county. Landslides mostly
occur for counties with small number of electors. For histogram (a) all counties have been considered and for (b) we have only taken counties with
more than 20 thousand electors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012446.g002
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R~
a=H
H{Hc
Hc
   : ð3Þ
The numerator measures the tendency toward tactical voting in the
system, the greater a=H, the stronger the response to polls. This
mechanism competes with the emergence of consensus due to
pairwise relationships. The strength of the psychological coupling
between individuals within a society is represented in the model by
the social degree of subcriticality. Therefore, in our model, for H
above Hc, in the limit of R~0, when electors decide regardless of
the global opinion and only are affected by their peers, rapidly a
clear majority appears. With increasing R, the tendency towards
tactical voting becomes more relevant and the margins of victory
diminish. In the limit of large R, the winners’ fraction of votes is
slightly above 1=q, i.e., no clear majority evinces. For simplicity we
consider a square lattice where each node is an elector and solely
interacts with its nearest neighbors. In fact, as we discuss later,
societies are typically better described by small-world networks
where long-range connections are also present [11].
Results and Discussion
To verify the model, let us first consider Brazilian mayor
elections since, for such elections detailed data is available [21] for
the number of candidates for each election as well as their
percentage of votes. Besides, ballot is compulsory and the number
of cities and electors large (more than 5500 cities and 108 electors).
Since results are resilient over the three elections (2000, 2004, and
2008), we consider, unless otherwise stated, the average over them.
Figure 3(a) shows the winners’ distribution of votes in the mayor
elections with two candidates. We use these results to characterize
the society in terms of the ratio R, of Eq. (3). Fitting the
simulational results (q~2) to the empirical ones, we obtain
a=H~0:0069 and (H{Hc)=Hc~0:01, corresponding to a ratio
R~0:69. Since the competition involves only two candidates, the
winner’s percentage of votes is always above 50%. In fact, most of
the winners have a fraction of votes below 70%, in agreement with
the predicted small margins of victory. The real distribution is
characterized by an exponential tail [17] which is also obtained
with our model. Additionally the model shows that the asymmetry
of the distribution increases with a.
Let us consider now the limit of large R, i.e., when the strength
of the feedback field is much larger than the interaction with peers.
In this limit the function from Eq. (2) can be simplified as,
F&aNvf(vf{vs), ð4Þ
using the equality
P
i d(si,f)~vfN, where N is the number of
individuals in the system. The distribution of the winner’s fraction
of votes in this limit is then
Figure 3. Model comparison with empirical results for Brazilian mayor elections. Winners’ distribution of votes (green) for elections with: a)
two, b) three, and d) four candidates. Due to the resilience of the 2000, 2004, and 2008 results, we average over these three elections to improve
statistics. The red-solid lines are the same distributions obtained with the model for R~0:69, by considering a weighted average over three system
sizes, namely, 502, 752, and 1002 electors. The blue-dashed lines correspond to the square lattice with 502 electors. The black-dashed-dotted lines are
obtained on the small-world topology with R~0:46. The second candidate’s distributions for the elections with three candidates are included as well
(c). All results are averages over 5:104 samples.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012446.g003
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: ð5Þ
For the special case of two candidates (q~2), since vs~1{vf, Eq.
(5) simplifies as P(vf)!exp {aNvf(2vf{1)
  
. The resulting
dominance of the exponential tail is a trademark of all
distributions which has also been pointed out in empirical
investigations [17].
Since both the degree of subcriticality and tactical voting
impact characterize the society, they should be independent on
the number of candidates. In Fig. 3(b) we also see the winners’
distribution of the fraction of votes for elections with three
candidates. Results for the candidates ranked as second are
included as well, Fig. 3(c). Since three candidates are considered,
the first candidate has always more than 1=3 of the total number
of votes and the second and third less than 1=2 and 1=3,
respectively. For the winner, a maximum close to 50% is obtained
and low margins of victory are observed. As for elections with two
candidates, more than 99% of the winners obtain less than 70%
of the total votes. The red-solid lines represent the simulations for
q~3 using the parameters obtained from elections with two
candidates. A good quantitative agreement between simulational
and empirical results is obtained for both candidates (first and
second). Following Duverger’s law, a polarization between two
candidates is observed. Also in Fig. 3(d), we show results for
elections with four candidates. Once again, with the same
parameters of the two-candidates elections, our model is able to
reproduce the empirical results.
As referred before a square lattice is not very realistic due to
the lack of long-range connections. In real systems, individuals
can contact each other beyond their neighborhood (e.g., by
phone, e-mail, virtual-social networks…). To account for such a
type of connections we also consider a small-world network [22].
To generate the graph we start with a square lattice and
randomly add long-range links until 10% of the individuals have
five bonds. As seen from the black-dashed-dotted line in Fig. 3, it
is again possible to quantitatively reproduce the empirical
distributions for all considered numbers of candidates with a
single value of R, namely, R~0:46. Different values of R were
obtained for the small-world and regular networks. Yet, for each
type of topology, when the same value is considered for elections
with different number of candidates, the main features of the
distribution of votes are recovered. The real topologies of interest
for opinion dynamics (for example, friendship) are typically small
world without scale-free properties [23]. For scale-free networks,
with an exponent of the degree distribution cƒ3, models of
opinion dynamics, as well as magnetic ones, are characterized by
a clear dominance of an opinion over the other, due to the
presence of highly connected nodes [11,24–26]. This is not
observed in the empirical results which is consistent with the
assumption that topologies underlying opinion interactions are
not scale free.
Figure 4. Comparison between different systems. (a) Distribution of the winners’ fraction of votes for mayor elections in different countries,
namely, United States 2008 (red circles) [27], Canada 2008 (blue stars) [28], and Brazil (green triangles) [17,21] where, for the latter one, results have
been averaged over three different years 2000, 2004, and 2008, to improve statistics. (b) Distribution of the winners’ fraction of votes for different
number of candidates, namely, three (red-solid line), four (blue-dashed line), and five (green-dotted line). Observed shift with increasing numbero f
candidates has been removed for four and five candidates. (c) Distributions for the candidate ranked second. (d) Distribution of the winners’ fraction
of votes for different values of relative strength of the feedback field, for R~0:69 (red-solid line), 0:99 (blue-dashed line), and 1:29 (green-dashed-
dotted line). All simulational results have been averaged over 5:104 samples on a square lattice with 2500 electors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012446.g004
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United States (2008) [27] and Canada (2008) [28]. In Fig. 4(a) we
show the winners’ distribution of votes for these elections together
with the ones from Brazil [17,21]. Regardless of the number of
candidates, a maximum is clearly observed for a fraction of votes
around 0:5, with small margins of victory. For most countries the
available results are not organized by the number of candidates,
therefore, to compare the impact of the feedback field in different
countries, it is useful to analyze how the distribution changes with
the number of candidates in our model. In Fig. 4(b) we show this
dependence by considering elections with three, four, and five
candidates. We use always the same value of the relative strength
of the feedback field, R. With increasing q a shift of the peak to
lower values occurs, which is also observed in the empirical results
for three and four candidates in Ref. [17]. To compare the tails of
the distributions we remove this shift (0:045 and 0:09 for four and
five candidates, respectively). We observe that the right-hand side
tail of all distributions are the same. Besides, a polarization
between the first two candidates is observed for all values of q in
the inset of Fig. 4(c).
To understand how the right-hand side tail is affected by the
ratio R, we show in Fig. 4(d) the distributions for different values of
R (0:69, 0:99, and 1:29). The larger the strength of the feedback
field, R, the steeper the right-hand side of the distribution. A larger
R can be achieved either through a decrease in the degree of
subcriticality or an increase in the impact of the feedback field.
Therefore we can still draw conclusions about the relative strength
of the feedback field, through the right-hand side of the
distributions for different countries, regardless of the number of
candidates. From Fig. 4(a) we observe that the impact of the polls
in United States and Canada are very similar. Yet, in Brazil the
impact reveals to be even stronger.
Summarizing, to understand plurality elections, we put forward
a model where the relevant parameter corresponds to the ratio
between the strength of polls impact and society’s degree of
subcriticality. With the model we have been able to compare the
distributions from three large countries, namely, United States,
Canada, and Brazil. The analysis reveals a similar impact of the
polls on the elections in United States and Canada and an even
stronger one in Brazil. Using available results for mayor elections
with two candidates in Brazil, we have been able to parametrize
the set of electors. With the obtained parameters we reproduce the
distribution of the fraction of votes in elections with three and four
candidates. The model has been implemented on a square lattice
and a small-world network and, despite the differences discussed
previously, the main features of the model do not depend on these
topologies, e.g., for both systems, the small margins of victories as
well as the polarization between the first two candidates
(Duverger’s law) are quantitatively reproduced. At this stage, our
model does not account for blank or null votes, notwithstanding,
that such votes shall not affect the candidates’ relative fraction of
votes. Our approach opens up the possibility to make statistical
predictions about the outcome of elections by determining the new
characteristic parameter R defined as the ratio between polls
feedback and herding. The next challenge would be to determine
this factor R from independent controlled experiments as, for
instance, through Internet surveys or questionnaires in schools or
neighborhoods.
Methods
We have performed Monte Carlo simulations on the square
lattice, for three different system sizes, namely, 502, 752, and 1002
electors, and on the small-world network with 502 electors. All
results have been averaged over 5:104 samples.
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